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THE AUDACITY OF IGNORING HOPE:
HOW THE EXISTING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ANALYSIS
LEADS TO UNREMEDIED RIGHTS
ABSTRACT
This Comment uses Kerns v. Bader as a lens to examine how the
qualified immunity analysis can lead to constitutional rights without a
remedy. That gap between the right and its remedy affects the articula-
tion of important constitutional rights, and ultimately the right itself. In
the absence of guidance about what it means for a right to be clearly es-
tablished, courts face difficulty in even declaring official conduct as un-
constitutional. Over time, as more instances of official conduct go with-
out being declared unconstitutional, the contours of our rights become
constricted. That absence of guidance also means the caprice of a judge
can decide whether a right was clearly established, requiring an arbitrary
degree of factual specificity in making that judgment, and ultimately
leaves the protections afforded by important rights unpredictable. In ad-
dition, discretionary sequencing in the qualified immunity analysis-
deciding cases on the qualified immunity prong while leaving the consti-
tutional merits unaddressed-means the law never becomes clearly es-
tablished, the law never gets articulated, never develops, and rights artic-
ulation stalls. As the articulation of our rights slows, those rights are in-
creasingly left without a remedy for their violation.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a military veteran.' You are honorably discharged
and return home from Afghanistan2 to try to resume a normal life. You
live in an ordinary neighborhood, in fact right on the eighteenth hole of a
golf course. You are at home one night with your parents and your girl-
friend, and while they are all inside sleeping, you have gone outside to
work in your garage and driveway.4 You are listening to music as you
work on rearranging and organizing the storage area in the garage and
side of the house.5 A police helicopter is hovering overhead somewhere
in the neighborhood, although you have no idea why it is there.6 Then,
suddenly, you hear a loud popping noise.7 You look up and see the heli-
copter start to wobble, and hear it make a whining pitch as it nosedives,
crashing in a backyard on the golf course less than a mile away from
where you are standing.8
You are a former military helicopter mechanic,9 and so you imme-
diately drop what you are doing. You leave the garage door open, the
music on, and the items you were organizing still scattered about the
garage and driveway and rush to the scene of the crash.'o When you get
there, you help by instructing the on-scene police officers about how to
open the helicopter doors to pull the occupants from the wreckage."
Once the injured passengers have been removed from the crashed heli-
copter, you turn your attention to the other officers and begin to relay to
them the events you just witnessed. 2 Attempting to aid the police offic-
ers in their investigation, you tell them you heard a shot and that you
think it came from near your home.
By the time you return home from all this, you learn that during the
course of investigating your tip about the shot you heard, three police
officers entered your home without a warrant while you were still at the
crash site.14 The officers searched your home only briefly, but they woke
up your girlfriend and confronted her in the living room while brandish-
1. The facts retold throughout this "Introduction" come from the facts of Kerns v. Bader, 663
F.3d 1173,1178 (10th Cir. 2011).
2. Carolyn Carlson, Copter Suspect Had Sniper Skills, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Albuquerque,
N.M.) (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.abqjoumal.com/news/metro/381480metro08-17-05.htm.
3. Kerns v. Bd. of Comm'rs (Kerns II), 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (D.N.M. 2012).
4. Kerns v. Bd. of Comm'rs (Kerns 1), 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010),
rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
5. Id. at 1200.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 1201.
8. See id.
9. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1178.




14. See Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1177.
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ing their guns. They did not enter your parents' bedroom because your
girlfriend told the police they were sleeping.16
Later, you are arrested and spend nearly nine months in jail, only to
be released when the prosecutor determines that the Government did not
actually have enough information to charge you with anything.17 It then
becomes clear to you that you were immediately a suspect in the police's
eyes. The police officers, instead of thanking you for rushing to the scene
and for trying to help them with the investigation, suspected you were
involved. They wanted to arrest you. They wanted to put you in jail.
You want to be vindicated. The police targeted you for a crime you
did not commit and entered your home without a warrant that night. You
want to be vindicated for having been put in jail for nine months for do-
ing nothing except trying to help. In short, you want to be compensated
for the violation of your constitutional rights.
But your quest for a remedy quickly encounters an obstacle. The
police officers claim that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred be-
cause exigent circumstances justified their entry into your home.18 You
go to court where a federal district judge agrees with you. But on appeal
in the Tenth Circuit, a panel of federal judges finds that the officers' ex-
planation of a perceived emergency does, in fact, justify their entry, and
you now have no recourse at all.19
Moreover, you come to find out that even if the appellate court had
found a Fourth Amendment violation, you still would likely have no
remedy because it requires you to overcome the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity. To do so, you must show that the law was "clearly
established," 20 which requires your attorney to engage in a "scavenger
hunt"2' to find a case that is factually similar to yours.22 But, both unfor-
tunately and unsurprisingly for you, there has never been any litigation
on the factual scenario of a police helicopter being gunned down in a
residential neighborhood leading to a warrantless search of a witness's
home. And the really twisted part? If this exact same thing happens
again, you-or whoever the next party to suffer the same harm turns out
21to be-still will not have an avenue for recovery.
15. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04.
16. Id at 1204.
17. See Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1180.
18. Seeid.at 1181.
19. See id. at 1182 (reversing only on the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity
analysis, indicating no disagreement with the lower court's determination that a constitutional viola-
tion occurred).
20. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
609 (1999); infra text accompanying notes 40-55.
21. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
22. See Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1192-93 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
23. Although this depiction might seem to cut in favor of the plaintiffrs version of the facts,
that perspective is the appropriate standard to use when making the determination about whether to
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This series of events actually happened to Jason Kerns. After the
helicopter crash, Kerns brought a § 1983 claim against the three police
officers who entered his home without a search warrant, claiming that
they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.24 All three of the defendant officers moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of qualified immunity, claiming that an exigent cir-
cumstance justified their entry. 2 5 The trial court found a constitutional
violation and denied summary judgment on qualified immunity.26 The
officers appealed.2 7 On interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit declined
to affirm the constitutional ruling and remanded the case for rehearing on
the qualified immunity question.
This Comment advances two primary arguments regarding the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Kerns v. Bader.2 8 First, it agrees with the dis-
senting judge that the Tenth Circuit inappropriately decided an interlocu-
tory appeal of a lower court's denial of qualified immunity. Specifically,
the court erred by deciding questions of fact that affected whether exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless entry of a private resi-
dence.2 9 Second, the Comment argues that the court created an insur-
mountable hurdle for the plaintiff to overcome the qualified immunity
defense.30 That is, it indicated that the plaintiff would have to find a case
so factually similar that it would be virtually impossible for the plaintiff
to do so.3'
The Comment then turns to the consequences of the court's deci-
sion. The Tenth Circuit vacated the denial of qualified immunity, yet
failed to address the merits of Kerns's Fourth Amendment claim. The
decision therefore not only left Kerns without a remedy but also failed to
clarify the law so that future plaintiffs who suffered similar constitutional
harms could recover.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the evolution of qualified
immunity doctrine. Specifically, it examines the notice requirement, the
award summary judgment on qualified immunity. See, e.g., Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th
Cir. 1994).
24. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1180. Kerns also brought § 1983 claims under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments relating to the police scrutiny and privacy invasion of his medical records.
Police, without a warrant, obtained those records. Despite many cases cited by the dissenting judge,
the majority held that the privacy right was not clearly established. Kerns also brought § 1983 claims
of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against several other officers and a
ballistic forensics expert. Although these claims illustrate the complicated jurisprudence surrounding
qualified immunity and the clearly established requirement, they are largely unnecessary to the
analysis of this Comment. Therefore, the Comment will focus only on the Fourth Amendment issue
raised regarding the warrantless entry of Kerns's home.
25. Id. at 1180-81.
26. See id. at 1180.
27. Id.
28. 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
29. Id at 1191 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
30. Id at 1192-93.
31. See id.
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issue of whether the constitutional merits should be considered before the
qualified immunity defense, and the clearly established standard used to
establish and overcome a qualified immunity defense. Part H addresses
the Fourth Amendment issue: whether exigent circumstances and proba-
ble cause justified the search of Kerns's home. Additionally, this Part
discusses how ignoring principles from prior cases leaves those individu-
als whose constitutional rights have been violated with no remedy and
explains that this constricts the development of the right itself. Part III
discusses the qualified immunity appeal in Kerns and the Tenth Circuit's
decision to remand the lower court's denial of summary judgment for the
officers. It first addresses the threshold concern of the appropriateness of
doing so on interlocutory appeal while avoiding decision on the constitu-
tional merits of the case. Second, Part III addresses the broader relation-
ship between rights and remedies; it uses Kerns as an example of how
the remedy afforded for violations of our constitutional rights shapes the
contours of those rights at stake and how the absence of a remedy leads
to the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights in general, particularly in
situations where courts can rely on the qualified immunity analysis to
avoid decision on the constitutional issue. Part IV proposes a solution to
the gap that exists between rights and remedies that is perpetuated by
courts addressing the clearly established prong of a qualified immunity
analysis without also addressing the constitutional merits. The "Kerns
solution" ensures that the law is articulated and remedies are afforded to
future victims for the violations of their rights.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code allows individuals to sue
for money damages when a government official acting "under color of
law" violates their constitutional rights.3 2 Although it is not itself a sub-
stantive right, § 1983 provides an avenue for individuals to recover for
constitutional harms inflicted "under color of law" and is a mechanism
for getting into court to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Consti-
tution by suing the offending official for money damages.
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense available to govern-
ment actors facing monetary liability in § 1983 claims.34 Qualified im-
munity protects government actors who violated an individual's constitu-
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or caus-
es to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress....").
33. See id.; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-76, 181-82, 184, 187 (1961) (dis-
cussing the history of § 1983 and the meaning of "under color of law").
34. E.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 815 (1982).
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tional rights but who did so in a "reasonable" manner, meaning that the
official could not have been expected to know that her conduct was un-
constitutional.3 5 To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff
needs to prove two elements: (1) that a constitutional violation actually
occurred, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the
harm such that a reasonable officer would know that what she was doing
violated that right.36
Three principal rationales underlie the qualified immunity defense.
First, we do not want to over-deter police officers from taking action for
fear of lawsuits. 3 7 Second, courts want to afford leeway to government
actors who are required to use discretion and make decisions in tense or
rapidly evolving situations. Third, qualified immunity allows courts to
articulate constitutional law without subjecting officers to retroactive
liability.39
A. Evolution of Qualified Immunity: Notice
Courts used to consider an officer's subjective intent in determining
the availability of the qualified immunity defense.4 0 In Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald,4' the Supreme Court eliminated the subjective intent prong of the
qualified immunity inquiry, primarily to make cases easier to decide on a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment and thus dispense
with lengthy, fact-intensive trials for unmeritorious claims.42
As part of overcoming a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff
must succeed on the clearly established prong of the analysis by showing
that the official was on notice that his conduct violated a constitutional
right. The Supreme Court held in Anderson v. Creighton43 that the right
the official is alleged to have violated must have been clearly established
in a particular and relevant way so that a reasonable official would un-
35. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The
qualified immunity doctrine does expand to slightly more than just protecting officers who reasona-
bly violate constitutional rights from liability, but for the purposes of this Comment, the important
concept is that the doctrine protects officers who "reasonably" violate constitutional rights.
36. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 55 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609
(1999).
37. E.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 ("[T]he public interest may be better served by action taken
'with independence and without fear of consequences."' (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967))); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
38. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
39. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Furthermore, qualified immunity avoids requiring officers to spend-
ing time in court and conserves resources that might otherwise be spent on lawsuits were it not for
qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
40. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556-57 (holding that the good faith and probable cause standard for
the defense to false arrest and imprisonment was applicable to § 1983 claims).
41. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
42. Id at 815-16; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (stating that the immunity is from suit,
not just from monetary liability).
43. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
652 [Vol. 90:3
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derstand that he is violating a constitutional right.4 4  In Brosseau v.
Haugen,4 5 the Supreme Court emphasized that whether a right was clear-
ly established depended on the facts of the case and held that the right
must be particularized in order to meet the requirement.4
However, in Hope v. Pelzer,47 the Supreme Court, in reversing a
lower court's grant of qualified immunity, said that the standard of find-
ing "materially similar"48 facts was a "rigid gloss on the qualified im-
munity standard" and was not necessary to ensure that officers are put on
notice that their conduct is unconstitutional. 4 9 The Court further stated
that "general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving
fair and clear warning"50 and that "a general constitutional rule already
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the
specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has
not previously been held unlawful." 5 1 Aside from that, the Supreme
Court has given little clarification on what is suitable to qualify as clearly
established for the purposes of a qualified immunity analysis.
B. Evolution of Qualified Immunity: Sequencing
In Wilson v. Layne,52 the Supreme Court recognized a two-part in-
quiry for qualified immunity analyses and suggested a proper sequence
for that inquiry. 53 A court must first determine whether there was a viola-
tion of a constitutional right.54 If so, a court must then determine if the
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.55
44. Id. at 640 ("[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly
established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.").
45. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
46. Id. at 198-99, 201.
47. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
48. Id. at 739 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (1Ith Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
51. Id. (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270-71) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Hope thus shifted the qualified immunity
analysis from a scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts toward the more relevant
inquiry of whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described conduct was unconstitution-
al. As this Court held even prior to Hope, qualified immunity will not be granted if government
defendants fail to make 'reasonable applications of the prevailing law to their own circumstances."'
(quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001))).
52. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
53. Id. at 609 ("A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether
the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all ..... (quoting Conn v.
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
54. See id. ("Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity
question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the
officers and the general public.").
55. Id.
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In Saucier v. Katz,56 the Court made the Wilson sequencing ap-
proach mandatory, holding that courts had to approach the qualified im-
munity analysis in the proper order, addressing the constitutional issue
before going on to address the clearly established, or qualified immunity,
prong." When addressing the first prong, whether an officer's conduct
violated a constitutional right, courts were instructed to consider the facts
in the light most favorable to the party alleging the injury. 8 In addressing
the second prong, whether the right was clearly established, the Court
thought it critical to articulating the law that this be analyzed in light of
the specifics of the case, not in a broad or general context." This inquiry
also was meant to "advance understanding of the law and to allow offic-
ers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified immunity is applicable.', 0
The rationales for following this sequence are as follows: "First, it
clarifies the law so that police officers may avoid future violations if
their conduct is held unconstitutional." 61 Additionally, courts are more
willing to articulate new constitutional law principles without subjecting
officers to liability for seemingly reasonable actions taken in uncertain
legal situations or under tense or uncertain circumstances.62 Following
this sequence also "ensures that, in the future, a similarly-wronged plain-
tiff would be able to recover if she had, in fact, suffered a violation of her
constitutional rights."6 If courts were to decide the clearly established
prong first, without litigating the merits of the constitutional issue, then
the same § 1983 claims could be brought repeatedly and never actually
become clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity. An-
swering the clearly established question first would allow officers to take
multiple bites at the "constitutionally forbidden fruit," and leave future
plaintiffs with no remedy for similar recurring constitutional violations. 4
The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of articulating consti-
tutional principles in Wilson, stating that "[d]eciding the constitutional
question before addressing the qualified immunity question also pro-
56. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).




61. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 668 (2009).
62. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
63. Leong, supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656-57 n.8 (10th Cir. 1987); John
M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil
Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 430 (1999) ("When a court bypasses the
merits of the pleaded constitutional claim in the circumstances just described, it not only effectively
awards the defendant officers one 'liability-free' violation of the Constitution (as it must under the
doctrine of qualified immunity), but it also, by declining to 'clearly establish' the undermined right,
paves the way for 'multiple bites of a constitutionally forbidden fruit."' (quoting Garcia, 817 F.2d at
656-57 n.8)).
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motes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of
both the officers and the general public."65
Conversely, the critics of sequencing have pointed out that sequenc-
ing fails to "adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding un-
necessary decision of constitutional questions." 66 In some cases, a se-
quenced-based decision can insulate that decision from appellate review,
even if the constitutional ruling is incorrect.67 If a defendant is found to
have violated the Constitution but prevails on qualified immunity, then
"[a]s a prevailing party, the defendant cannot appeal the constitutional
ruling, even if it believes the ruling is incorrect and the consequences of
that ruling are unfavorable for both that defendant and others who are
similarly situated." 68
Commentators have also expressed practical concerns with manda-
tory sequencing. Specifically, courts will be forced to decide complicated
constitutional issues unnecessarily, wasting judicial resources when it is
clear that a defendant will prevail on qualified immunity.6 9 Similarly,
there are concerns that deciding constitutional issues on underdeveloped
factual records and under busy conditions will lead courts to the wrong
answer, thus articulating bad (constitutional) law. 70 Finally, the immunity
afforded to defendants is often characterized as freedom from suit, not
just freedom from liability.7' Mandatory sequencing has the potential to
result in officers being forced to endure lengthy litigation on the constitu-
tional issue, only later to be found entitled to qualified immunity.7 2
Ultimately, mandatory sequencing was short-lived. In Pearson v.
Callahan,7 3 the Supreme Court acknowledged the criticisms of mandato-
ry sequencing despite having made it compulsory only eight years earli-
er.7 4 In doing so, the Court overruled the mandatory nature of the Saucier
65. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
66. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); see also Leong, supra note 61, at 676-77 (pointing out that the avoid-
ance principle is rooted in separation of powers and largely related to concerns of altering statutory
laws from the bench, a concern inapplicable in the qualified immunity context). Further, I would
argue that although constitutional questions should often be avoided in other areas of law, it simply
does not make sense to adhere to the avoidance principle when the issue at hand is actually a consti-
tutional issue. This is tantamount, in my opinion, to ignoring the basis of the entire litigation and the
underlying interest of articulating the law.
67. Morse, 551 U.S. at 431; Brosseau v. Haugen 543 U.S. 194, 202 (2004) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) ("[Sequencing] can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulted
from review. . . ."); see also Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1020-21 (2004).
68. Leong, supra note 61, at 678; see also Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1020-21.
69. E.g., Brosseau, 543 U.S at 201-02 (citing Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1025) ("[W]hen courts'
dockets are crowded, [sequencing] makes little administrative sense .... ).
70. E.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring); Cnty. of Sacra-
mento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 858-59 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Leong, supra note
61, at 681 n.73.
71. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
72. Id.
73. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
74. Id. at 234-35.
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sequence and announced that although the two-part inquiry survived and
may still often be appropriate, it was thenceforth permissive. 5 In direct-
ing lower courts when the sequence was appropriate, the Supreme Court
gave remarkably ineffectual guidance by instructing judges to simply
"exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand."76
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
AND THE AUDACITY OF IGNORING HOPE
In Kerns, the Tenth Circuit remanded the trial court's denial of
summary judgment on qualified immunity for the three officers who en-
tered Kerns's home with no warrant.77 The Tenth Circuit's determination
on the qualified immunity issue essentially expressed its view that the
officers had an objectively reasonable belief that an exigent circumstance
existed, although it held that the lower court did not address the issue
with sufficient depth. 7 8 Because the Tenth Circuit remanded the case on
the clearly established prong, it did not address the Fourth Amendment
question. But the law was clear that a Fourth Amendment violation oc-
curred. As the dissent pointed out, "Some cases ... require a more par-
ticularized inquiry. This is not one of them.... The Officers had neither
a warrant nor probable cause. If the circumstances they encountered did
not support a reasonable belief [in an exigency, the entry] violated clear-
ly established Fourth Amendment law."79 The Kerns court should not
have remanded the case. It should have affirmed the lower court's ruling
or rejected the interlocutory appeal altogether because both were rooted
in factual evaluations.
The absence of Supreme Court guidance about the clearly estab-
lished standard makes it difficult for judges to declare an action unconsti-
tutional. That difficulty is because of the uncertainty about how specifi-
cally precedent applies in determining what amounts to a constitutional
violation. This uncertainty about what serves as binding precedent for
constitutional violations enables courts to ignore the constitutional ques-
tion altogether, which affects the articulation of constitutional rights. By
remanding Kerns to the lower court, the Tenth Circuit not only denied
Kerns a remedy for the violation of his right but also left the law unclear,
ensuring that the next similarly situated plaintiff would also be left with-
out a remedy.
Kerns raises two principal issues regarding the violation of one's
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, which I
75. Id at 236.
76. Id.
77. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2011).
78. Seeid.atll81-83.
79. Id. at 1192 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
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will discuss in turn in subparts A and B. First, the officers had no objec-
tively reasonable basis to believe that an exigent circumstance existed to
justify their warrantless entry of Kerns's home. Furthermore, the deter-
mination of any such belief being objectively reasonable was fact de-
pendent and therefore a question for a jury. Second, even if the police
officers could prove an objectively reasonable belief in an exigency, their
warrantless entry and search of Kerns's home was unreasonable. Even in
exigent circumstances, police still need probable cause to search a home
without a warrant, and the officers in Kerns were unable to establish
probable cause. Finally, in subpart C, I will examine the effect that the
context of litigation has on articulating rights, specifically how litigation
in either a criminal or a civil context can affect the available remedy for
violations of rights and how the relationship between the litigation con-
text and the available remedies can affect the underlying right itself. I
will examine these issues with an eye toward the underlying rationales of
qualified immunity, the specificity required by the court in making the
clearly established determination, and the relationship between constitu-
tional rights and the remedies afforded for their violation.
A. Objectively Reasonable Belief in an Exigency
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures.80 Warrantless searches are presumptively unrea-
sonable and thus presumptively unconstitutional.8' To justify as constitu-
tional the warrantless entry into a home, officers need to prove that one
of the established exceptions, such as consent or exigent circumstances,
-82applies.
In United States v. Najar,83 the Tenth Circuit, following the Su-
preme Court's announcement in Brigham City v. Stuart,84 put forth the
two-part test for determining whether an exigent circumstance exists to
justify the warrantless entry of a home.85 First, "officers [must] have an
objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to
protect the lives or safety of themselves or others."8 6 Second, the manner
and scope of the search must be reasonable.87 In the context of the Kerns
decision, only the first prong is controversial.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
81. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980).
82. E.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 578-81, 583; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57
(1967); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 712-13, 715, 717, 721 (10th Cir. 2006).
83. 451 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2006).
84. 547 U.S. 398, 405-07 (2006).




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Applying that test to Kerns, the issue was whether the officers who
entered Kerns's home without a warrant had an objectively reasonable
basis to believe there was an immediate need to protect the lives or safety
of themselves or others. If the officers had a reasonable belief, then the
warrantless entry was justified and no constitutional violation occurred.
If the officers did not have a reasonable belief, then the entry was not
justified and Kems's Fourth Amendment right was violated. The deter-
mination of that objectively reasonable belief rests squarely on the as-
sessment of the facts of the case. Any exigency that the police perceived
was not objectively reasonable because (1) the officers had the oppor-
tunity to ask Kems about the condition of his home (thus, there was no
immediate threat), and (2) the circumstances justifying the exigency were
factually in dispute (and therefore, by definition, not objective).
Recall that in Kerns there was a police helicopter downed by a gun-
shot." Kems was the only person to claim that the sound he heard came
from near his home.89 But he said that he heard a "loud pop sound,"90 not
shots. He explained that the sound just as likely could have been a car
backfiring.9' None of Kerns's nearby neighbors confirmed hearing a
noise.92 In fact, most of his neighbors were unaware that the helicopter
crash had occurred at all.93
The officers argued that their warrantless entry was justified under
an exigency exception.94 They claimed that the condition of Kerns's
driveway and home provided an "objectively reasonable basis to believe
there [was] an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves
or others . . .. Specifically, the police asserted exigent circumstances
existed because a door was left open, music was left on inside the home
(which may or may not have stopped playing at some point), a window
was broken (which was actually merely damaged), boxes were left scat-
tered about the driveway in an untidy manner, and no one answered the
door.96
But before entering, the police at Kerns's home were in contact with
the officer at the crash site who was with Kerns. In fact, the police were
in contact with Kems via the officer at the scene the entire time-even
asking follow-up questions about where specifically Kerns thought he
88. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011).
89. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
90. Id at 1200.
91. Id at 1201.
92. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1178.
93. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. 1176, 1204 (D.N.M. 2012).
94. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1181.
95. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).
96. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1177; Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-03.
97. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. at 1200.
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heard the shot come from, where he was standing, etc.98 The police at
Kerns's home could have easily and quickly radioed to the crash site to
ask Kerns if anyone was home, or if the door being open alarmed Kerns,
or if Kerns had left music on.99 Or they could have simply asked Kerns
for consent to enter his home. The officers' purported belief in an imme-
diate need to protect themselves or others by entering Kerns's home
seems unreasonable given these facts.
Fourth Amendment doctrine is very clear: warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable.100 To overcome that presumption, police
officers must have probable cause and justify the search pursuant to one
of the categorical exceptions, such as an exigency.10 As the dissenting
judge in Kerns pointed out, "If the circumstances [the officers] encoun-
tered did not support a reasonable belief that danger to someone was
imminent, then" they violated Kerns's Fourth Amendment right.10 2
Fourth Amendment doctrine regarding exigent circumstances states
that in the absence of a warrant, the police need probable cause and an
objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to
protect the safety of themselves or others.' 03 With respect to Kerns, the
determination of whether an exigency existed depends on whether objec-
tively reasonable officers outside of Kerns's home would have believed
there was an immediate need to enter the home to protect the safety of
themselves or others.'0 Only if that belief were found reasonable, would
the warrantless entry be constitutionally justified. At best, that exigency
is a question of fact most suitable for a jury given the disputed facts re-
garding the officers' alleged justification for the warrantless search. At
worst, the exigency simply did not exist.
But there are even more specific statements of law regarding when a
warrantless entry is constitutionally justified under an exigency excep-
tion. In United States v. Martinez,'0 5 the Tenth Circuit held that officers
violated Mr. Martinez's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his
home with no warrant and could not establish a reasonable belief in an
98. Kerns, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
99. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. at 1187 ("Johnston did not speak directly with J. Kerns, but
spoke through other law enforcement officers, and, using this technique, Johnston clarified J. Kerns'
perceptions concerning the directionality of the noise J. Kerns heard.").
100. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980).
101. E.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 578-81, 583; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57
(1967); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 712-13, 715, 717, 721 (10th Cir. 2006).
102. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1192 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
103. E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006); Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89;
Najar, 451 F.3d at 718.
104. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1193 ("[T]he majority's statement of the issue it would have the dis-
trict court address suffers from other flaws. The majority's reference to the Officers' 'belief that
exigent circumstances existed should not deter the district court on remand from correctly focusing
on whether a reasonable officer would have believed that exigent circumstances existed (an issue
which, as I have said, must in this case be resolved by the jury).").
105. 643 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2011).
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exigent circumstance. 106 In Martinez, the officers, responding to a 911
call,
knocked on the front door[,] . . . received no response[,] ... inspected
the perimeter of the house[,] . . . saw no signs of forced entry[,] ...
nor heard anyone inside. The officers then ... found a closed but un-
locked sliding glass door into the house. Through the glass, they
could see some electronics boxes near the door and . . . the house
looked disheveled....
The officers entered through the unlocked door .... 107
Martinez is a case from the same circuit, involved officers from the
same county as those in Kerns, and was decided only five months before
Kerns. But Martinez reached a different conclusion about the constitu-
tional violation. As it relates to articulating rights, the contrast between
the two cases shows that what facts amount to a constitutional violation
is anything but concrete and fails to make the law predictable or clear for
anyone. 0 8 That opacity also makes courts' determination about the con-
stitutional violation more difficult. 109 Without a national standard to fol-
low, courts vary both in what they deem a constitutional violation and
what is adequately clearly established law sufficient to give an officer
"fair and clear warning" that his conduct was unconstitutional."1 0
Warrantless searches violate clearly established Fourth Amendment
law "unless the police can show that it falls within one . . . carefully de-
fined set of exceptions based on the presence of 'exigent circumstanc-
es."i" Given that "[t]he government bears the burden of proving the
exigency exception"'1 2 and that "[t]hat burden is especially heavy when
the exception must justify the warrantless entry of a home,""l3 it seems
unreasonable that the Government could to prevail at the summary
judgment stage, particularly in light of the factual dispute raised by Mr.
106. Id. at 1293-94.
107. Id. at 1294-95.
108. And recall Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), where the Court stated, "Deciding the
constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in
the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public." Id.
at 609; see also infra text accompanying notes 172-95 (noting how the context of articulation may
help to explain the different results).
109. If the law were clearly established, the Kerns court could have relied on prior decisions to
find a constitutional violation. Because the law is unclear, the determination of whether a constitu-
tional violation occurred is made more difficult.
110. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
Ill. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) ("[E]xceptions to the warrant requirement are 'few in number and have
been carefully delineated."' (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318
(1972))); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582-86 (1980).
112. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Welsh, 466 U.S. at
750 ("[T]he burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless . .. entries.").
113. Najar, 451 F.3d at 717.
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Kerns.l 14 The presumption of unreasonableness regarding warrantless
searches also explains, as the Kerns dissent points out, why the lower
court did not devote a great deal of its analysis to the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment law regarding warrantless entries into a private
residence was clearly established; it was obvious." 5
Although the Government bears the burden of demonstrating exi-
gent circumstances, 1 6 in the interest of not over-deterring police from
making split-second judgments in favor of public safety, courts afford
deference to police in reviewing those split-second judgments. But even
affording police that deference and conceding the point that this was a
tense and rapidly developing situation, the entry into Kerns's home was
outside that cushion of discretion. Further, the question of whether the
situation supported a reasonable belief of an imminent threat so as to
justify the warrantless entry is one that was rooted in evaluations of fact.
And, as the district court held, that question was one for a jury."
Affirming the constitutional violation in Kerns would not have had
the effect of over-deterring police from acting in the interest of public
safety. Even had the qualified immunity ruling been affirmed, the Gov-
ernment would likely have indemnified" 8 the officers in Kerns, so the
penalties would have been levied against the County of Bemalillo, not
against the officers themselves." 9 Given that this is the same county
sheriffs department as in Martinez,120 and that those police officers un-
der remarkably similar circumstances entered private homes without
warrants, it is not unreasonable to think that additional deterrent
measures against the county would be warranted. The Tenth Circuit's
Martinez decision and the district court's opinion in Kerns, both finding
a constitutional violation, also suggest that deterring that behavior is de-
sirable. 12 1
114. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) ("[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal
one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of
violation of clearly established law." (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985)
(internal quotation mark omitted)); id ("[A] qualified immunity ruling ... is ... a legal issue that
can be decided with reference only to undisputed facts and in isolation from the remaining issues of
the case."' (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 n.10) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
115. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
116. Najar, 451 F.3d at 717; see also Welsh, 466 U.S at 750.
117. The assessment of whether officers had a reasonable belief is different from cases like, for
example, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), where the exigency is one that the officers
actually observed. Id. at 400-01. There, officers could hear yelling from inside the home, observed
an individual punch someone, and saw the victim bleeding. Id. That situation reflects an objective
exigency determination because of a danger to someone inside the home that was actually observed
by officers. Id. at 401-03.
118. SeeN.M.STAT.ANN. §41-4-4(2012).
119. See Leong, supra note 61, at 668 n.1.
120. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2011).
121. Id. at 1299-1300 ("The sanctity of the home is too important to be violated by the mere
possibility that someone inside is in need of aid-such a 'possibility' is ever-present. It is for this
reason that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are 'subject only to a few
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The Kerns court should have affirmed the constitutional ruling. Alt-
hough Martinez was decided five months before Kerns, the search in
Kerns actually happened prior to that in Martinez, so the officers in
Kerns could not have been aware at that time.122 But as it relates to the
constitutional merits of Kerns, the Tenth Circuit decided the cases within
the same year. And in light of Martinez, the court missed the opportunity
to articulate constitutional law in Kerns. Given the remarkably similar
facts in Kerns and Martinez, it should have been easy for the Kerns court
to at least affirm the constitutional violation, even if it were to remand
the qualified immunity holding, as it did.
In Kerns, the site of the helicopter crash can be more appropriately
characterized as the locus of a tense and rapidly developing situation
than can Kerns's home. At the crash site, several witnesses reported
hearing a shot that had come from the immediate area.123 In contrast,
there were no substantiated reports of a shot (or noise) from near Kerns's
home 24 other than from Kerns himself, who claimed to have heard a
noise that "could have been engine backfire or a rifle report."l 25 The cir-
cumstances outside Kerns's home were relatively benign when compared
to the facts of other Tenth Circuit cases where a reasonable belief in an
exigency was found to exist.126 The circumstances in Kerns do not seem
to add up to a basis for a reasonable belief in an imminent threat inside
Kerns's home that would constitutionally justify the warrantless entry.
The officers could have reasoned that because Kerns was the one to
report the noise, he could be the shooter and thus there could have been
people injured in his home. The problem with this justification is that it
starts to look as if the police were suspicious of Kerns and entered his
home with an investigatory purpose and only relied on the exigency ex-
ception in hindsight as a pretext for entering without a warrant.127
Furthermore, the police in Kerns had ample opportunity to establish
a more ironclad exception to the warrant requirement: consent. Not even
attempting to get Kerns's consent when he was conversing with an of-
ficer at the crash site less than half a mile from his home seems unrea-
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
390 (1978))).
122. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011); Martinez, 643 F.3d at 1294.
123. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
124. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1178.
125. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
126. See infra note 144 (collecting the Tenth Circuit's exigency cases).
127. Warrantless entry is not justified by an investigatory purpose. If the only justification the
police had was a suspicion of Kerns, then the investigatory entry of his home is a plain violation of
the Fourth Amendment and one that is clearly established. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
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sonable.12 8 Moreover, that continuous contact with Kerns undermines the
argument that the officers believed an imminent threat existed inside the
home. If the officers were operating under that belief, why not alert or
ask Kerns about it?129
For their part, the officers asserted that it is a "well settled"o30 prin-
ciple that "officers can reasonably search for victims upon reports of
gunfire."l31 Citing Michigan v. Fisher,132 the officers pointed out that
they do not need "ironclad proof' of a life-threatening injury to invoke
the emergency aid exception.' 33 However, even affording police wide
deference, the situation in Kerns and the warrantless entry seem to be
outside the margin of error within which reasonable constitutional viola-
tions fall, even in light of Fisher.
Not only was there no "ironclad proof' of an imminent, life-
threatening danger in Kerns's home, which police concededly do not
always need, there was hardly any objective reason to suspect people
inside the home were in grave danger or were a threat to the police. And,
even if there had been a reason to suspect a grave danger, why not radio
the officer at the crash site and ask Kerns about the conditions at the
home, or for consent to enter? Although police should be given plenty of
leeway, the reasoning the police officers relied on in Kerns to justify
their warrantless entry does not add up to an objectively reasonable fear
for safety so much as it does to an investigation of someone the police
thought was suspicious, which is a clear constitutional violation.134
128. The failure to get Kerns's consent when he was conversing with an officer at the crash site
could itself be considered a Fourth Amendment violation because the Fourth Amendment protects
against "unreasonable searches." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. 1176, 1200 (D.N.M. 2012) ("The Court lent weight to the
Kerns' argument that, 'if there was concern for the safety of people possibly inside the Kerns' home,
Bader, Thompson, and Carter could have learned if there were people in the Kerns' home directly
from J. Kerns, with whom Johnston was in radio contact,' and noted that the officers' actions once
inside the home undercut their explanation for preceding without a warrant or consent." (quoting
Kerns v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 2009 WL 3672877, at *9 (D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2009))).
130. Id at 1197 (quoting City Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Their Motion for
Summary Judgment Requesting Dismissal of Counts 1, X, and Xiii of Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint at 10, Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.N.M. 2010) (No. CIV 07-771 JB/ACT), 2009
WL 4993511, at *10).
131. Id
132. 558 U.S. 45 (2009) (per curiam).
133. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. In Fisher, the facts more strongly indicated a real
emergency inside the house. There, police responding to a disturbance call were directed to a specif-
ic house "where a man was going crazy," according to witnesses. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 45. The scene
outside the house was chaotic: several smashed windows-both the house and cars outside-a
damaged fence on the property, and blood on the outside of the house. Id at 45-46. Furthermore, the
officers, who could see Fisher inside the house "screaming and throwing things," observed that he
was cut and bleeding, and when they asked if he needed medical attention, he began cursing at them
and eventually pointed a gun at one of the officers. Id. at 46-47. The Kerns case is a far cry from
Brigham City, though. In Brigham City, as with Fisher, the officers were able to make a determina-
tion that an emergency existed because of a danger to someone inside the home that was actually
observed. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.
134. Although somewhat far-fetched, I concede that it is possible the police officers may have
believed Kerns could have just gone on a rampage, killed his family, shot down the helicopter, and
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In any event, although over-deterring police is a genuine concern,
and courts should not haphazardly second-guess police decisions made in
dangerous situations, 3 1 the police here had ample opportunity to assess
an ostensibly nonthreatening situation and to ask Kerns about the un-
locked door, the damaged window, and the music, before entering his
home. Unlike most other Tenth Circuit cases where an exigency was
determined to exist,'36 in Kerns there was no imminent threat apparent
from outside Kerns's home, 137 no reports had singled out his home as a
threat or as suspicious, 38 no movement was detected inside the home, 139
nothing was known about the residents,14 0 and there were no obvious
signs of a crime or injury having taken place there.141 The objective facts
regarding the condition outside Kerns's home and the conduct of the
officers before entering make it seem likely that the officers' justification
of being worried about the safety of those inside the home was a pretext.
It seems just as likely that the officers were suspicious of Kerns and only
after entering his home and getting caught with their hands in the cookie
jar by Kerns's girlfriend, did they try to justify their warrantless entry
made with investigatory motives by claiming exigent circumstances.
Throughout litigation, Kerns's arguments focused mostly on distin-
guishing his case from those cases where an exigency was found to have
existed. Kerns focused less on finding cases with somewhat similar facts
where the holding was that no exigency existed. However, it is question-
then feigned as a good Samaritan to hide his crimes (helping police at the crash site and disclosing
that he only heard the gunshot). But although that may have created a reason for the officers to be
suspicious of Kerns, it still in itself does not demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that there
was an imminent threat to themselves or others. Particularly in the absence of any verifying evi-
dence, it amounts to a mere police suspicion.
135. E.g., Rybum v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 991-92 (2012) ("[Jludges should be cautious about
second-guessing a police officer's assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented by a
particular situation.").
136. See infra note 144 (collecting the Tenth Circuit's exigency cases).
137. See United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that warrantless
entry was justified under exigency exception where the defendant, suspected of bank robbery, fired
gunshots through a window at police).
138. See United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding an
exigency justified a warrantless entry where police responded to multiple 911 calls reporting gun-
shots in an apartment identified by a tenant as the source of shots, witnesses stated that the occupants
were known to have guns, and the gun owners' cars were parked outside the apartment).
139. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 720 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that warrantless
entry was justified under exigency exception where a 911 call was silent, call-back attempts went
unanswered, police responding had the 911 operator call and police could hear the phone ringing
inside thus confirming the call came from that residence, and police could see and hear someone
inside the home who, when he eventually answered the door, denied having called 911).
140. See United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
exigency justified arrest inside a home pursuant to a search warrant where police knew that two
target-residents were drug dealers, gang members, and known to carry firearms).
141. See Michigan v. Fisher, 548 U.S. 30, 45 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that an exigency
justified warrantless entry where police, responding to a disturbance, were told by witnesses that a
man "was going crazy," there were broken windows on the home and broken glass on the ground,
blood on the exterior of the home, and the officers could see the resident inside throwing things and
yelling).
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able that it would have mattered.14 2 Most of the controlling Tenth Circuit
cases dealing with whether an exigency exists 4 3 require more than was
present in Kerns to find that one did.'" In contrast to these cases, in
which the exigency usually arose in part because the police were alerted
to a threat in an identified residence and were uncertain as to the wherea-
bouts of the suspect or resident of the home, Kerns was nearby with a
police officer, was aiding the police in the crash investigation, and could
have been contacted.145 Even if the officers were suspicious of Kerns and
142. See United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1293-95 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding no
exigency when officers, responding to a 911 call, could not locate or contact the resident, received
no answer upon knocking on the door, the house looked disheveled, boxes were scattered around,
and a door was unlocked).
143. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15, 617-18 (1999) (holding in part that to clearly
establish a law requires controlling precedent in that circuit or by the Supreme Court, or a consensus
of persuasive authorities). Because it, too, is rather vaguely defined, I will ignore the consensus arm
of this test throughout this Comment.
144. See Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d at 1224 (holding an exigency justified a warrantless entry
where police responded to multiple 911 calls reporting gunshots in an apartment identified by a
tenant as the source of shots, witnesses stated that the occupants were known to have guns, and the
gun owners' cars were parked outside the apartment); Najar, 451 F.3d at 717-18, 720 (collecting
sources and holding that warrantless entry was justified under exigency exception where a 911 call
was silent, call-back attempts went unanswered, police responding had the 911 operator call and
police could hear the phone ringing inside thus confirming the call came from that residence, and
police could see and hear someone inside the home who, when he eventually answered the door,
denied having called 911); United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
an exigency justified the warrantless entry into an apartment after ordering everyone out, including
defendant who had brandished a weapon, to search for anyone who may have been harmed or in-
jured); United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288-90 (holding that a warrantless entry was justi-
fied under exigency exception where officers observed defendant buying materials to manufacture
methamphetamines and, after smelling methamphetamine being cooked, had reasonable belief that
the officer and public safety were threatened by a potential methamphetamine lab explosion); United
States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding an exigency justified no-knock
entry where police knew location of defendant's residence, defendant was thought to carry a gun,
and thus posed a threat to officers' physical safety); United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1285
(10th Cir. 2000) (holding an exigency justified arrest in home pursuant to search warrant where
police knew that two target-residents were drug dealers, gang members, and known to carry fire-
arms); United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 970-71 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the warrantless
entry of motel room was justified under exigency exception where investigation of suspect estab-
lished probable cause and combination of factors, including safety and destruction of evidence);
United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 622 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding a warrantless entry was justified
by "presence of a legitimate and significant threat to the health and safety of the arrestee" who was
with officers); United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the totality of
circumstances demonstrated an exigency relating to officer safety that justified a warrantless search
where agents investigating a suspected smuggling operation saw marijuana in plain view through the
window of a parked airplane); United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that warrantless entry was justified under exigency exception where the defendant, suspected of bank
robbery, fired gunshots through a window at police). But see Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1293-95
(finding no exigency when officers, responding to a 911 call, could not locate or contact the resident,
received no answer upon knocking on the door, the house looked disheveled, boxes were scattered
around, and a door was unlocked); United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding no exigency existed where officers had no reasonable belief that safety of officers or of
defendant's wife was at risk, defendant was communicating with officers, and defendant had no
known reputation for violence); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 538 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that no exigent circumstances existed where a door of a commercial building was open and officers
claimed entry for protection of property to justify warrantless entry).
145. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
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reasoned he was the shooter, he was with police already and did not pose
an immediate threat that would justify the officers' warrantless entry.
The established principle that warrantless searches require probable
cause and a clear, objective basis for belief that an exigency exists should
have led the Kerns court to affirm the Fourth Amendment violation. Exi-
gency law is clear,14 6 so the important question in determining the consti-
tutional violation was whether the officers' belief was objectively rea-
sonable. And that question of whether the belief in an exigency was ob-
jectively reasonable was based in facts and therefore more appropriate
for a jury.147 It certainly does not meet the standard for summary judg-
ment, particularly given that the movant could not show that there was
no dispute as to material facts.14 8 These facts were material to the deter-
mination of whether an objectively reasonable belief in an exigency ex-
isted, and therefore to whether a constitutional violation occurred. Alt-
hough many qualified immunity cases are appropriately decided at sum-
mary judgment, Kerns is not one of them. In Kerns, the determination of
the constitutional violation itself turned on whether a reasonable belief in
an exigency justified the warrantless entry.
In Anderson, the Supreme Court held that whether exigent circum-
stances support warrantless searches requires an examination of the "in-
formation possessed by the searching officials." 49 Notwithstanding the
factually disputed information known to the police who entered Kerns's
home, the police were armed with the knowledge that.Kerns could be
contacted via radio. This also arguably should have led the Kerns court
to affirm the constitutional ruling. Especially in light of Martinez,so
where contact with the homeowner was a point of discussion surrounding
a reasonable belief in an exigency, failure to contact Kerns, when it was
known by the officers that they could have done so without any delay,
amounts to a violation of Kerns's Fourth Amendment right. Because the
right in this context will not have been established, the result of failing to
affirm the constitutional ruling leaves Kerns, and the next similarly situ-
ated plaintiff, without a remedy for the violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment right.
B. Probable Cause
In addition to demonstrating an objectively reasonable belief in an
exigency, defendants must prove they had probable cause. Thus, even if
146. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404-06 (2006); United States v. Najar, 451
F.3d 710, 718 20 (10th Cir. 2006).
147. See generally Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Farmer v. Colo. & S. Ry. Co.,
723 F.2d 766, 768 (10th Cir. 1983) ("An appellate court should not overturn a trial court's finding of
fact unless it is definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.").
148. See infra text accompanying notes 215-29.
149. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
150. See United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1293-94 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002).
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the police officers are able to demonstrate an objectively reasonable be-
lief in an exigency, "officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus
exigent circumstances in order to make lawful entry into a home."' 5 1 And
even as mushy as the standard is, the officers in Kerns could not establish
probable cause on the facts.
Although it is understandable that the officers would be amped dur-
ing a tense and chaotic situation following the shooting of a police heli-
copter and eager to find and arrest the shooter, situations like that should
not justify diminishing the constitutional protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment. If anything, that is precisely the situation when it is
most important to uphold and reinforce those protections to deter under-
standably excited and potentially rancorous police officers from over-
reaching their bounds and violating the constitutional rights of private
citizens.
Officers Bader, Thompson, and Carter were at the Kerns residence
with Officer Johnston.15 2 Officer Johnston was the only one of the four
who did not enter the home.15 3 These officers, while unable to articulate
specific facts to establish probable cause leading to their warrantless en-
try, alluded to "feel[ing]" the need to get in the house to make sure no
one was hurt.15 4 Affording officers leeway is an important rationale of
qualified immunity. But that latitude must be balanced somehow against
the type of intrusion that follows in order to preserve the individual con-
stitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment, particularly when the
subject of the search is a place as sacred as a home.15 5 The requirement
of probable cause provides that balance and equilibrates the interests of
the police in protecting public safety with the interests of individuals to
be free from unreasonable searches.
Even as opaque as the probable cause standard is, it is hard to find
enough to establish probable cause on the facts of Kerns.156 Here, "[t]he
officers did not report seeing any movement inside the Kerns' home" and
"[o]ther than the broken window, [Officer] Bader did not find any evi-
151. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002); see also Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402;
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980); Najar, 451 F.3d at 718.
152. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
153. Id.
154. See infra note 163.
155. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreason-
able governmental intrusion.' With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no." (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 573 ("The physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.").
156. Establishing probable cause as it relates the warrantless entry seems difficult here. How-
ever, the probable cause that the police asserted for Kerns's arrest warrant (a separate issue in Kerns)
seems reasonable based on the unchallenged information included in the warrant affidavit. See Kems
v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1187-90 (10th Cir. 2011).
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dence revealing where a shooter may have been standing."' 5 7 These ob-
servations should have indicated that no shooter was ever present there
because "Bader is a trained human tracker" and thus should have been
able to make a determination about recent foot traffic in or out of the
home.'
The small hole broken through the window was one of the primary
justifications for the officer's assertion that an exigency existed.'59 But
the window was actually only broken through a single pane of a double-
paned window, and "a golf ball striking the Kerns' window would not
have been out of the ordinary, because the Kerns' backyard borders the
eighteenth hole of the Paradise Hills golf course."160 It is also plainly
unreasonable to conclude that the second pane of glass could have
stopped a bullet (was it magic glass?). And if it was a bullet that made
the hole in the outer pane, but was thwarted by the second pane, where
was the bullet?
In addition to there being no evidence of any person responsible for
the shooting, "many officers at the Kerns' home were searching for 'shell
casings, guns, [and] people,' but no such evidence was ever found
there."61 Johnston, one of the officers present at Kerns's home stated
that he "did not think that the shooter would be found at the scene, be-
cause of the time lag between the helicopter crash and his arrival at the
Kerns' home."l 62
In fact, both Officers Bader and Johnston later conceded that they
could not come up with an articulable reason that led them to believe
someone in the home was injured or in danger.163 Thus, these officers
157. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1187 (D.N.M. Aug. 2012).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1187-88.
160. Id. at 1187.
161. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sergeant Robert Johnston's deposition).
162. Id. at 1189-90. That "time lag" also points to the exigency having ended. See Flippo v.
West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1999) (concluding that when the exigency ends, so does any
justification for warrantless entry); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1978) (rejecting a
"murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement and holding that when the exigency ends, so
does the justification for warrantless entry).
163. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 n.20 ("Kerns pointfed] to Johnston's statement, in
response to a question whether he could articulate what led him to believe that someone may have
been hurt inside the house, that, '[a]t this point in time, no, sir.' Later in his deposition, however,
Johnston state[d]: 'When we got to the Kerns residents [sic] and the door was open, the lights were
on, the music was playing loud, it was late at night, early in the morning, nobody was answering the
door, for whatever reason, and the fact that a shooting had taken place of a helicopter, unknown if
anybody else had been shot in the interim prior to, after, whatever that yes, I felt at that lime we
needed to gel in that house to make sure there was nobod' injured inside that house."' (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Sergeant Robert Johnston's deposition)); id. ("In response to a
question whether [Officer Bader] could articulate any objective facts that made him think someone
had taken refuge inside of the house, Bader said 'no.' Earlier in his deposition, however, Bader had
stated: 'So now we are thinking well, the door is unlocked, we haven't found the offender, now
nobody is coming to the door. There may be somebody hurt or maybe somebody being held hostage.
We really don't know what's going on yet and that's not good. I mean, this is as far as we know, and
we don't have the information to tell us otherwise, this is basically the scene of a crime. This is
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could not even meet an articulable suspicion standard, a standard below
that of probable cause.'1" It appears that no probable cause existed given
that the officers at Kerns's home did not have enough evidence to sug-
gest that a crime had occurred there or that an immediate danger existed
inside the home. Furthermore, two of the officers admitted to not having
enough evidence to meet an even lower standard of suspicion. The offic-
ers who entered the home were presumably either acting on a hunch or
were motivated by an investigatory purpose, neither of which is constitu-
tional.
It looks more like the police aspired to investigate Kerns, entered
his home to do so, and worked backwards to justify their warrantless
entry pretextually only after Kerns's girlfriend caught them inside. For
his part, Kerns asserted (seemingly correctly) that the officers entered his
home because they considered the home a crime scene connected to the
helicopter shooting and were beginning to investigate it.'65 This assertion
is consistent with the testimony given by Officer Bader that "this is basi-
cally the scene of a crime. This is where somebody shot down a helicop-
ter."l66 However, the Fourth Amendment law is clear that "the serious-
ness of the offense under investigation [does not] itself create[] exigent
circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a
warrantless search."1 6 7
In the absence of probable cause and an objective exigency, the.
warrantless entry of a private home is unreasonable and therefore uncon-
stitutional.'68 No objective exigency and no probable cause add up to a
violation of Kerns's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches.
C. Context's Effect on Articulating Rights
The Tenth Circuit seemed to disregard the statements made by Of-
ficers Bader and Johnston-two of the officers at Kerns's home-that
they could not articulate a reason as to why they believed someone in the
home was injured or in immediate need of help. The court also did not
seem to afford deference' 6 9 to the lower court's ruling or to consider
many of the facts in the "light most favorable to the" plaintiff, as it was
where somebody shot down a helicopter. That's a big deal, and to have these people now not able to
come to the door to contact us is extremely troubling."' (emphasis added) (quoting Officer Drew
Bader's deposition)).
164. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
165. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
166. Id. at 1190 n.20 (quoting Sergeant Robert Johnston's deposition).
167. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394.
168. E.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002).
169. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006).
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required to do.170 Why did the Kerns court think these statements were
not important?
One explanation is that the court did not believe that these particular
statements were important to their determination given the entirety of the
statements made by the officers during their depositions. Or perhaps the
court's decision here is representative of the general trend in Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search and seizure jurisprudence to move
away from the strict warrant requirement and towards a balancing of
police interests against individual privacy interests.' 7 ' But if this were the
reasoning, and if the court had assessed the justification of the warrant-
less entry under the general reasonableness standard, the court likely
would have found the officers' justification unreasonable.
Another possible reason that the court disregarded the officers' own
admissions is that the context in which claims are brought and litigated
affects how judges think about Fourth Amendment protections.172 Most
Fourth Amendment claims are brought in criminal proceedings and are
made in an attempt to exclude evidence obtained as the result of an al-
legedly unreasonable search.173 Professor Leong has suggested that the
exclusionary remedy is one that judges see as a "massive remedy" and a
"get-out-of-jail-free card," and that they are therefore reluctant to grant
defendants-who have already been all but proven to have been in pos-
session of contraband by the very nature of their appearance in an exclu-
sionary hearing-the benefit of excluding the evidence. 174 That aversion
to granting the exclusionary remedy in most Fourth Amendment claims
leads judges to "distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was
not really violated,"' and thereby constrict the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. That judicial focus on Fourth Amendment claims in the
criminal context, then, leads judges to become accustomed to the practice
of deciding cases in a rights-constrictive manner, rather than a rights-
expansive approach. 176
170. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001), abrogatedon other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
171. The trend in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of moving from a strict warrant require-
ment toward a general reasonableness balancing approach is beyond the scope of this Comment, but
see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857,
894 nn.155-58 (1999) (collecting sources).
172. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 418-21 (2012) (discussing how the
context in which litigation is brought affects the articulation of rights). "Context" is used here to
"refer to a given set of remedial, factual, and procedural circumstances," for example, criminal or
civil proceedings. Id. at 407.
173. Id. at 430.
174. Id. at 430-31 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (discussing the effect of single-context litigation through the lens of the available
remedies).
175. Id at 431 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 799 (1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
176. Id. at 431-32.
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As it relates to Kerns, the Tenth Circuit possibly reasoned that be-
cause no evidence was obtained as the result of the unreasonable search
and the standard remedy for unreasonable searches is to exclude the evi-
dence obtained, Kerns really suffered no tangible injury. It would follow
that as a result of the standard exclusionary remedy not being applicable
in this case, Kerns's constitutional injury likewise was not cognizable as
a Fourth Amendment claim. If a judge routinely rules on Fourth
Amendment claims against unsavory criminal defendants who have been
caught with contraband and seek to exclude unreasonably obtained evi-
dence, then what could compel a judge used to that routine to grant mon-
etary damages to a plaintiff who ostensibly suffered no harm at all?
Interestingly, in Martinez, the Tenth Circuit only five months before
Kerns decided an exigency case of warrantless entry with similar officer
justifications to those made in Kerns. The court held that "[b]ecause the
officers lacked a reasonable basis for believing an individual inside Mr.
Martinez's home was in need of immediate aid or assistance, we agree
with the district court's determination that the warrantless search of Mr.
Martinez's home was a violatici of the Fourth Amendment."177
Martinez was an appeal by the Government from a district court's
grant of a motion to suppress.' 7 ' There, the officers who entered the
home with no warrant claimed a belief in an exigency when after knock-
ing on the door with no response, they "inspected the perimeter of the
house" 7 9 and approached an "unlocked sliding glass door [through
which] they could see some electronics boxes near the door and they
noticed that the house looked disheveled." 80 They then entered the home
and "spent approximately five minutes inside."' 8'
The facts in Kerns are extraordinarily similar. Recall in Kerns that
the officers entered the home with no warrant, claiming a belief in an
exigent circumstance when, after knocking on the door with no response,
they inspected the perimeter of the house.' 82 Upon inspection, the offic-
ers noticed the generally disheveled condition outside the home: boxes in
the driveway and garage, a broken (damaged) window, no lights on, and
177. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011).
178. Id. at 1293.
179. Id. at 1294.
180. Id. at 1295.
181. Id.; see also id. at 1296 ("The government contends the officers' warrantless search was
justified by exigent circumstances because the officers had an objectively reasonable belief that
someone inside the house needed immediate aid or was in danger. It emphasizes four facts to support
its position: (1) the static-only 911 call from the residence; (2) the 'disheveled' appearance of the
house; (3) the unlocked door on the backside second floor of the house; and (4) the electronics boxes
just inside the unlocked door.").
182. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1202-03 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
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music playing. 8 3 The officers in Kerns also entered the home through an
unlocked door and spent only about five minutes inside the home.18 4
The most notable factual difference between Kerns and Martinez
with respect to the belief in an exigency is that in Martinez, the "Berna-
lillo County Emergency Communication Center received a 911 call from
Mr. Martinez's residence. The 911 dispatcher who received the call
heard only static on the line."' 8 1 In Kerns, the plaintiff was actually with
the police and in contact with the other officers who were at his home.18 6
The other notable difference between Kerns and Martinez is that Mar-
tinez was litigated in the criminal context, regarding a suppression mo-
tion; Kerns was litigated in a civil context, in a § 1983 action.
A 911 call being placed from the home and the police thereafter not
being able to reach the owner of the home would sensibly seem to weigh
in favor of the court finding an objectively reasonable belief in an exi-
gency. But the Tenth Circuit, in Martinez, ultimately agreed with the
district court holding that the officers were unable to show a basis for an
objectively reasonable belief in an exigent circumstance. 8 7 Even noting
that "'reasonable belief is a lower standard than probable cause[,] ...
the district court was explaining that the evidence was neutral and did
not support an objectively reasonable belief there was any emergency in
the house."' 8 8 The Martinez court also noted the deference to be afforded
in reviewing the district court's ruling on factual circumstances sur-
rounding an exigency' 89 and that "[t]he burden of proof was on the gov-
ernment to establish that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless
search, and this 'burden is especially heavy when the exception must
justify the warrantless entry of a home."' 90 The Martinez court conclud-
ed:
The sanctity of the home is too important to be violated by the
mere possibility that someone inside is in need of aid-such a "pos-
sibility" is ever-present. It is for this reason that exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."l91
What explains the different decisions in Kerns and Martinez? The
simple explanation is that the judges found the evidence more compel-
183. Id; see also Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1777 ("[The officers] soon noticed that something seemed
amiss when they reached Mr. Kerns's house: a door was ajar, music was playing, no lights were
on.")
184. Kerns /, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04.
185. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2011). Remarkably, this case
took place in the same county as did Kerns.
186. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
187. Martinez, 643 F.3d at 1293-94.
188. Id. at 1299.
189. Id. at 1296.
190. Id at 1299 (quoting United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006)).
191. Id. at 1299-1300 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
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ling in one direction than I did. But another explanation is that the two
cases reveal that the context in which the constitutional right is litigated
affects what remedy is available, and the available remedies, in turn,
affect how courts ultimately define the scope of the right.
The striking similarities suggest that perhaps the available remedy
affected the respective courts' definition of the contours of the right at
issue.192 In Martinez, even considering the 911 call and the officers' ina-
bility to locate the homeowner, the court found that no reasonable belief
in an exigency existed to justify entry into the home.1 93 Therefore, in
Martinez, the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search was
suppressed. 194 In Kerns, however, the remedy of exclusion was not appli-
cable because no evidence was obtained as a result of the similarly brief,
similarly warrantless search.'9 Thus, akin to how an aversion to the ex-
clusionary remedy leads judges to reason that no Fourth Amendment
right was actually violated, the concept here is that if the standard reme-
dy cannot be applied, then the right itself must not have been violated in
any meaningful way.
III. RIGHTS, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
AND THE REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION THEORY
Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is de-
fect of right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will
do.
-Llewellyn, The Bramble Bushl96
[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a le-
gal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.
-Marbury v. Madisonl97
Daryl Levinson's "remedial equilibration"l9 8 model is an appropri-
ate way to think about what it means to have a right, and how the actual,
192. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 171, at 885 ("The defining feature is the threat of undesir-
able remedial consequences motivating courts to construct the right in such a way as to avoid those
consequences. At the extreme, where no viable remedy is at hand, courts may define the right as
nonexistent."); see also Leong, supra note 172, at 409 ("[T]he availability and scope of particular
remedies affects the substantive development of constitutional rights.").
193. Martinez, 643 F.3d at 1295-96.
194. Id. at 1300.
195. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1187 (D.N.M. 2012).
196. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 88 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008) (1930).
197. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1783)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. Levinson, supra note 171, at 858. Contrast the remedial equilibration theory with the
"rights essentialism" model, which assumes a "pure constitutional value" that is distinct from, and is
even "corrupted by being forced into[,] a remedial apparatus" as part of an operational function of
the real world, id., and is a really abstract Allegory ofthe Cave-type of way to think about rights.
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tangible remedy for the violation of that right is what defines the con-
tours of the right itself. Professor Levinson posits that rights and reme-
dies are ultimately inseparable from one another, that they are "inextri-
cably intertwined. Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very exist-
ence."' 99 As it relates to Jason Kerns, "the absence of any remedy at all,
render[s his Fourth Amendment] right essentially worthless"2 00 and any
protection afforded by it, means nothing.2 0 1
By allowing for a no-remedy situation, such as in Kerns, the court is
allowing the Fourth Amendment to be diluted. Although the Supreme
Court has elucidated several categorical exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement,202 Fourth Amendment doctrine is clear that police cannot en-
ter one's home without a warrant.2 03 If a warrantless search does not fall
within one of those categorical exceptions, it violates the Fourth
Amendment.204 The importance of a right is directly related to the afford-
ed remedy. That relationship means that in cases like Kerns, the Fourth
Amendment gradually becomes less of a guaranteed protection for indi-
viduals and simply one more trivial hassle that police officers sometimes
have to deal with after the fact.
In this Part, I will address three issues related to the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Kerns to reverse the lower court's denial of qualified im-
munity. First, this Part addresses the threshold procedural concern of an
appellate court deciding the fact-based exigency matter of whether an
objectively reasonable basis for belief in an imminent threat existed to
justify the officers' warrantless entry. Second, it addresses what the
clearly established requirement means in the absence of any guidance
from the Supreme Court and how that lack of guidance affects the rela-
tionship between constitutional rights and the remedies afforded for their
violations. Third, this Part addresses the issue of sequencing in a quali-
199. Id.
200. Id. at 888.
201. Although the actual entry into Kerns's home is a fairly benign harm, the principle applies
nonetheless. For a far more egregious illustration of a right without corresponding remedy, see
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). There, a man spent eighteen years in prison after
Brady violations-withholding exculpatory evidence-by a prosecutor who was held to be entitled
to absolute immunity for the intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence at Connick's trial. Id.
at 1355-56. For his nearly two decades in prison, enduring who knows what sorts of atrocities, and
missing out on a significant period of his free adult life, literally being deprived of his liberty-and
in many senses of the word, his life-Connick received a remedy of absolutely nothing because of
absolute prosecutorial immunity and the difficulty in proving municipal liability. Id. at 1356-58.
202. E.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987) (plain view exception); Welsh v. Wis-
consin, 466 U.S. 740, 742 (1984) (community caretaking exception); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 394 (1978) (exigent circumstances exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 295-96
(1967) (fleeing suspect exception).
203. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (holding it was "clear that any physi-
cal invasion of the structure of the home, 'by even a fraction of an inch,' was too much" (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
204. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-88 (1980);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
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fled immunity analysis and how a court's decision on the clearly estab-
lished prong without a decision on the constitutional merits affects both
the articulation of constitutional principles and the effect thereof on the
relationship between rights and remedies.
A. Cross-eyed and Procedureless
Facts are never what they seem to be, but appellate courts' standard
when reviewing questions of fact is limited to clear error.205 Although
"[t]he existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed question of law and
fact,"206 facts come with points of view. As a threshold matter then, did
the Tenth Circuit, in Kerns, even have proper jurisdiction to consider the
district court's holding on the issue of a reasonable belief in an exigency?
The lower court denied summary judgment because the issue was so
20factually dependent that it was a jury question.207 However, the Tenth
Circuit "do[es] not have jurisdiction to review the district court's factual
findings, including its finding that a genuine dispute of fact existed." 208
Moreover, "government officials cannot appeal pretrial denial of quali-
fied immunity to the extent the district court's order decides nothing
more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular
conduct occurred." 20 9 In Kerns, the district court denied summary judg-
ment on the qualified immunity issue, holding that "a jury could find that
there was no imminent threat that would justify the Officers' entry into
the Plaintiffs' home." 2t 0 As the dissenting judge in Kerns noted:
The question is not a difficult one in my view, and so I disagree with
the majority's decision to remand the matter to the district court to
rule again on this strictly legal question. The Officers had neither a
warrant nor probable cause. If the circumstances they encountered
did not support a reasonable belief that danger to someone was im-
minent, then the armed, nighttime entry into the home violated clear-
ly established Fourth Amendment law.211
The question of law to decide in Kerns was whether the law was
212**clear regarding exigent circumstances; it was. The critical inquiry was
whether those facts supported a reasonable belief in exigent circumstanc-
205. See generally Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Manning v. United States, 146
F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[An appellate] court must accept the district court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous."); Farmer v. Colo. & S. Ry. Co., 723 F.2d 766, 768 (10th Cir.
1983) ("An appellate court should not overturn a trial court's finding of fact unless it is definitely
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.").
206. United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992).
207. Manning, 146 F.3d at 812.
208. Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998).
209. Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516
U.S. 299, 312-13 (1996); Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313 (1995).
210. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1191 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1192.
212. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006); United States v. Najar, 451
F.3d 710, 717-18 (10th Cir. 2006).
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es. That determination of whether there was an objectively reasonable
belief in exigent circumstances, however, was a question of characteriz-
ing facts and that should have been put forth for a jury to decide.
Notably, in an opinion authored by the same judge who wrote
Kerns, the Tenth Circuit recently held that it is the
district court's exclusive job to determine which facts a jury could
reasonably find [and we are not to consider] . . . questions about what
facts a jury might reasonably find ... in appeals from the denial of
qualified immunity at summary judgment. . . . So, for example, if a
district court concludes that a reasonable jury could find certain spec-
ified facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court has indicated
we usually must take them as true-and do so even if our own de no-
vo review of the record might suggest otherwise as a matter of law. 213
In other words, whether a reasonable officer would have perceived
that an imminent threat of danger existed that would justify the warrant-
less entry and search of Kerns's home was a question of fact better suited
for a jury, particularly because that was the district court's determination.
In Martinez, working by hindsight and deferring to the district court's
ruling, the Tenth Circuit noted that its review "entails a determination
whether the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous, view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's find-
,1214ings.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Jones,2 15 the Supreme Court distinguished
reviewable summary judgment determinations from unreviewable ones,
holding that interlocutory appeals are not appropriate where the disputed
factual issue may affect the qualified immunity determination.2 16 But,
under Shroff v. Spellman,2 17 a recent Tenth Circuit case, interlocutory
appeals may still be appropriate if the factual dispute is immaterial and
would not affect the qualified immunity determination.
In Kerns, the facts the officers asserted regarding the existence of an
exigent circumstance were in dispute. That determination of a reasonable
belief in an exigency rested in large part upon
213. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010).
214. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Najar, 451 F.3d
at 717) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
216. Id. at 313 ("We now consider the appealability of a portion of a district court's summary
judgment order that, though entered in a 'qualified immunity' case, determines only a question of
'evidence sufficiency,' i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial. This kind
of order, we conclude, is not appealable. That is, the District Court's determination that the summary
judgment record in this case raised a genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners' involvement in the
alleged beating of respondent was not a 'final decision' within the meaning of the relevant statute.");
see also Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985).
217. 604F.3d1179,1186,1188(10thCir.2010).
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something seem[ing] amiss when they reached Mr. Kerns's house: a
door was ajar, music was playing, no lights were on. Things took an
even darker turn when the officers noticed a broken window. A sil-
ver-dollar-sized hole punctured a window of the house, with shatter-
ing concentrically outward. This, the police thought, might be the re-
sult of a gunshot-perhaps by the same sniper who had just fired on
the police. 218
However, Kerns disputed several of those facts, including that the
door was open219 and that Kerns described the noise he heard as a gun-
shot.220 While still waiting outside Kerns's home, the officers could not
agree even among themselves about whether the music was shut off at
some point.2 2 1 Furthermore, the "silver-dollar-sized hole" puncturing the
window actually only punctured a single pane of glass and may have
been more appropriately characterized as a "golf-ball-sized hole" given
that the damaged window was facing a golf course.222 As the dissent
pointed out, "[T]he majority seems to have strayed at times from viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as we are constrained to
do in the posture of this appeal."223 Finally, despite the second pane hav-
ing stopped whatever it was that punctured the first pane of glass, no
bullet was found.224
Thus, Shroff precludes review because these factual issues were
disputed and sufficiently material, meaning that the interlocutory appeal
was inappropriately undertaken.22 5 Even had the facts not been "disput-
ed" in the typical sense, the factual dispute was really, Do these facts
support "an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate
need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others"? 226 Put anoth-
er way, this was not a question of law; it was a question of fact. And, "it
is ... questions [of law]-and not questions about what facts a jury
might reasonably find-that we may consider in appeals from the denial
of qualified immunity at summary judgment." 2 27 Specifically, Kerns cen-
tered not on whether the law was clear but on how the facts could be
218. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011).
219. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010) ("Johnston's report alleges that
the garage door was open when Johnston and his SWAT team got to the Plaintiffs' residence. J.
Kerns, however, asserts that the garage door was closed when he left his home to go to the crash
[s]ite." (citations omitted)), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub non. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173
(10th Cir. 2011).
220. Id. at 1283 n.6 ("While the police consistently assert that J. Kerns told them that he heard
a gun shot, J. Kerns is equally insistent that he referred to the sound as a popping noise and stated
only that it could have been a rifle report when the officers pressed him for more detail.").
221. Id. at 1203 ("According to Johnston, ... the music coming from the residence played the
entire time.... Bader observed that the music that had been coming from the Plaintiffs' residence
turned off, which raised concerns . . . ." (citations omitted)).
222. Id. at 1202.
223. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1191 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
224. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1187 (D.N.M. 2012).
225. Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2010).
226. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).
227. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010).
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characterized to support an objective belief in an emergency or not. To
make that determination, characterizations of facts absolutely had to take
place.
Particular facts were the foundation for the officers alleged exigen-
cy assessment. These facts served as the basis for the Kerns dissent, the
lower court's determination that it was a jury question, and the Tenth
Circuit's reversal of the lower court's denial of summary judgment in the
officers' favor on the qualified immunity appeal.228 The disputed factual
issues clearly affected the qualified immunity determination, if not en-
tirely dispositive themselves Therefore, the Kerns case should not have
even survived to reach a decision on interlocutory appeal under the John-
son standard for unreviewable summary judgment determinations.229
B. Unclearly "Clearly Established"
Hope teaches that "general statements of the law are not inherently
incapable of giving fair and clear warning" to police officers that their
conduct is unconstitutional. 23 0 It follows that general statements regard-
ing when an exigency exists should have been sufficient to give the of-
ficers in Kerns fair warning about the constitutionality of their conduct.
Because "the Supreme Court has never given a fully cogent definition of
what it means for a right to be 'clearly established[,]' [t]he result is an
expansion of subjective judicial discretion and a decrease in the overall
uniformity of qualified immunity rulings."23 1
The Kerns majority accepted the interlocutory appeal but left unde-
cided the clearly established question because it felt it was "without the
benefit of a full analysis from the district court" and because "briefing on
appeal [was] less than entirely satisfactory." 23 2 However, "the majority is
incorrect to say that the district judge did not address the second prong of
the qualified immunity analysis" 2 3 3 sufficiently because "both aspects of
the qualified immunity test were placed in play by the parties before the
district court." 23 4 The majority even acknowledged that both parties did
indeed address the clearly established question in their briefs.235 Address-
228. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1191 (Holloway, J., dissenting) ("[The officers'] argument rests on
rejection of the district court's holding that the jury must decide questions of fact pertaining to
whether a reasonable officer would have perceived an immediate need to protect himself or others
under the circumstances. And as noted, that holding is not reviewable in this interlocutory appeal.").
229. Id. ("[Pursuant to Johnson, w]e do not have jurisdiction to review that holding in this
interlocutory appeal.").
230. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
231. John C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298-99
(2012).
232. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1182 (majority opinion).
233. Id. at 1192 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 1181 (majority opinion).
235. Id. at 1181 ("And even if they did somehow violate the Fourth Amendment, the officers
added, they did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law. In his opposition to summary
judgment, Mr. Kerns understood both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to be in play and
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ing the district court's perceived brevity, the dissent pointed out "that the
district court's concise treatment of the issue is completely unsurpris-
ing .... Some cases do indeed require a more particularized inquiry.
This is not one of them. . . . '[G]eneral statements of the law are not in-
herently incapable of giving fair and clear warning."'
2 3 6
By avoiding ruling on the constitutional merits while remanding the
denial of summary judgment, the Kerns decision begins to construct a
substantive change in Fourth Amendment protections from "the right ...
to be [free from] unreasonable searches" 237 to "' [t]he right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures only if such conduct is clearly estab-
lished at the time of the violation.' This amounts to ... instead of using
objective reasonableness as a guide, officers need only worry about what
has been clearly established" 23 8 in a manner particular enough to satisfy
the specific court hearing the case. Thus, the Kerns decision not only
leaves a right without remedy but also potentially provides an incentive
for unconstitutional police conduct. Ironically, it does so by (clearly)
establishing that so long as police officers can identify a unique fact, they
can achieve any objective without fear of liability by pointing to that
unique fact to characterize the situation as one that is not yet clearly es-
tablished. In effect, all police now need to do to become immune from
liability for unconstitutional conduct is say: Despite evidence to the con-
trary, it was unclear to us at the time, based on this or that excruciatingly
unique factual nuance, that the Fourth Amendment prohibits that.
The Supreme Court's failure to give any meaningful guidance about
what can serve as particular enough to clearly establish a right in order to
make the qualified immunity determination has led to an unpredictable 23 9
burden of proof for plaintiffs attempting to overcome a qualified im-
munity defense. It has also led to an unpredictable availability of reme-
dies for violations of Fourth Amendment rights.2 40 This unpredictability
results, at least in some cases, in the articulation of Fourth Amendment
doctrine that is rights-constrictive. 24' The lack of guidance about the
clearly established requirement leaves the availability of a remedy up to
the caprice of a judge who may or may not require a high degree of fac-
tual similarity.242 And, as discussed in the next subpart, judges tend to be
proceeded to explain .. . why our precedent clearly established that their conduct violated those
rights." (citation omitted)).
236. Id. at 1192 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
238. David B. Owens, Comment, Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibration: A Comment on
Herring v. United States and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 580 (2010).
239. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 272, 278 (2009).
240. See Williams, supra note 231 ("[T]he Supreme Court has never given a fully cogent
definition of what it means for a right to be 'clearly established.' The result is an expansion of sub-
jective judicial discretion and a decrease in the overall uniformity of qualified immunity rulings.").
241. See Leong, supra note 172, at 432-33.
242. One of the other issues raised by Kems-which is particularly illustrative of this point but
largely unnecessary to the analysis of this Comment-was the privacy protection of his medical
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reluctant to recognize a violation of a right where they are reticent to
afford a remedy. This reluctance also leads to an articulation of constitu-
tional law that is constrictive of constitutional protections. 24 3
The decision in Kerns not only is contrary to the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment (particularly given that it was Kerns's home that was
searched) but also leaves room for all police officers who conduct unrea-
sonable searches of a home to rely on any unique fact to provide them
with an escape hatch from liability for their unconstitutional conduct.
The Kerns decision is not an adherence to Hope. Warrantless searches
are unreasonable 244 and violate the Fourth Amendment unless they meet
the objective exigency exception.245 Without such a justification, police
officers violate the Fourth Amendment and should be held liable for do-
ing so. If no remedy is afforded for their violation, what is the point of
declaring the existence of rights at all? After all, what good is a right-a
constitutional guarantee, no less-if there is no recovery when a gov-
ernment actor violates it?
With no Supreme Court guidance about what it means for a right to
be clearly established, courts are left to determine whether the law was
clear on the unique facts of the case in front of them. This idiosyncratic
determination starts to make the qualified immunity analysis look almost
subjective, leaving courts to determine if the right in question was clearly
established in the opinion of that particular judge. This seems rather
analogous to the fact-intensive good faith inquiry abandoned in Harlow.
Furthermore, the articulation of constitutional law and principles be-
comes erratic and idiosyncratic to the specific situation presented to that
court. Without a baseline meaning for "clearly established," the determi-
nation of such leaves future decisions unpredictable and inconsistent.2 46
The Kerns court followed up its decision in Martinez by muddying
the law and leaving Jason Kerns without a remedy for the violation of his
Fourth Amendment right. That lack of remedy is something courts
should allow to happen only one time, in the interest of articulating the
law.2 47 But the goal of law articulation was not accomplished here. The
records, which the police officers also obtained without a warrant. Addressing both the merits and
the qualified immunity issue, the court held that the law entitling medical records to privacy protec-
tion was not clearly established enough. The dissent cited nearly a dozen cases dating back to 1977
to illustrate that the privacy interest in medical records is constitutionally protected and has been
clearly ruled as such in both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d
1173, 1198-1200 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
243. See infra text accompanying notes 262-67.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
245. See cases cited supra note 103.
246. And, "promot[ing] clarity in the legal standards for official conduct [is a benefit to] both
the officers and the general public." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
247. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 62 (noting one rationale of qualified immunity is that it allows courts to articulate constitu-
tional law without subjecting officers to retroactive liability).
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Kerns decision not only trivializes Kerns's Fourth Amendment right but
also adds to the watering down of Fourth Amendment rights in general.
To overcome a qualified immunity defense, should courts require
plaintiffs to engage in a "scavenger hunt for cases with precisely the
same facts"? 248 For example, to show that the right was clearly estab-
lished, should the Kerns plaintiff be responsible for finding cases where a
police helicopter was shot down, only one person in the immediate area
claimed to have heard a shot or a car backfiring but no neighbors con-
firmed hearing the noise, the door of a house was left open, there was
music on inside the house, and a window of a home on the eighteenth
hole of a golf course had a single pane of a double-paned window bro-
ken? Or should courts respect the lesson from Hope that "general state-
ments of the law" 249 (e.g., that "police, absent a warrant, need probable
cause and an objectively reasonable belief in an exigency to enter a
home") are enough to put police officers on notice that their conduct is
unconstitutional? 250 The Kerns court ignored the principle from Hope
that a general statement should suffice, and inappropriately appropriated
from the jury the ability to determine whether an objectively reasonable
belief in an exigency existed. It also demonstrated how divergent "clear-
ly established" standards can be-even within the same court and the
same year.
By remanding the district court's denial of summary judgment on
qualified immunity, the Kerns court ignored the principle from Hope
about general statements of law and required Kerns to engage in the sort
of factual "scavenger hunt" that Pierce warned about. 251 By ignoring
Hope, and because Kerns understandably could not find a case with the
exact same facts and in the same context-despite Martinez being ex-
ceedingly close-the court remanded the denial of qualified immunity.
That decision left not only Jason Kerns but also any similarly situated
plaintiff in the future with no remedy for the violation of his Fourth
Amendment right.
By taking the route it did and, in effect, holding on interlocutory
appeal that the law was not clearly established, the court ignored the les-
son from Hope that a right need only to be defined clearly enough to give
the officers "fair and clear" warning that their conduct violates the
Fourth Amendment. Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have
articulated as unconstitutional the warrantless entry of a private home
absent probable cause and an objectively reasonable exigency. At a min-
248. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
249. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
271 (1997)).
250. This leans towards being a fact-specific determination and one that is better suited for a
jury than for a judge on summary judgment, except that the justifications offered by the police were
arguably plainly unreasonable.
251. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1298.
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imum, the Kerns court missed an opportunity to articulate the law and
advance constitutional principles.
The law has already established the categorical exigencies that al-
low for warrantless searches to be upheld as constitutional. The law is
also clear that officers need an objectively reasonable belief in an immi-
nent threat to qualify for the exigency exception to the warrant require-
252ment. By examining the minutia of the facts of this case (a job usually
reserved for a jury) instead of simply asking itself whether this falls with-
in one of the clear exigency categories, the court has carved out an ex-
ception to the exception and leaves the issue of warrantless searches less
clear than it was before Kerns. Thus, the next time a warrantless search
happens, the offending officers can simply rely on this decision to de-
clare that the law was not clearly established enough.
C. Sequencing Issues
In addition to highlighting how the clearly established determina-
tion can lead to rights without remedies, the Kerns decision also demon-
strates that same ill effect as a result of permissive Saucier sequencing.253
Even though the constitutional issue was acknowledged, it was not de-
cided at the circuit court level. This means the law is actually less clear,
and one more constitutional violation of this exact kind will have to oc-
cur before it can even potentially become clearly established. Not hold-
ing police liable for reasonable mistakes is an underlying rationale of
qualified immunity. In the interest of that policy rationale, courts should
allow for only a single violation to take place and then articulate the law
accordingly without subjecting officers to liability. 25 4
But the situation here is different. By not addressing the constitu-
tional issue and remanding the case to a lower court for final decision,
the Kerns court has ensured that this exact same constitutional violation
can occur without consequence at a minimum one more time. And the
reality is that the one-more-violation estimate is the best-case scenario.
Because even if the very same constitutional violation does occur, it only
becomes clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity if it
reaches the Tenth Circuit for decision.2 55 And even then, it only becomes
clearly established if the decision somehow survives under both Martinez
252. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006); see also cases cited supra
note 103.
253. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234-35 (2009).
254. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); see also Garcia ex rel. Garcia v.
Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 n.8 (10th Cir. 1987) (.'[O]fticials might believe they 'have one bite of the
apple.[]' But if courts cannot prospectively articulate constitutional standards, there looms the even
more unpalatable possibility of multiple bites of a constitutionally forbidden fruit." (quoting Com-
ment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity
Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 926 (1984))).
255. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15, 617-18 (1999) (holding in part that to clearly
establish a law requires controlling precedent in that circuit or by the Supreme Court, or a consensus
of persuasive authorities).
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and Kerns, the prospect of which seems impossible. Furthermore, the
judge hearing the case would then have to choose to address the constitu-
tional merits, instead of only whether the law was clearly established.
The result is that officers are likely to get many bites at the "constitution-
ally forbidden fruit" before the law becomes clear enough to forbid it.
That unremedied right is supposed to be allowed to happen only to
the immediate plaintiff, in the interest of not chilling police behavior.25 6
But by not addressing the constitutional issue, the court left the right to
be free from unreasonable searches in the absence of an exigency unes-
tablished.257 And by not establishing the officers' conduct as a constitu-
tional violation, the Kerns court left the harm to the immediately plaintiff
unremedied and left the right without a corresponding remedy for future
plaintiffs.
To be fair, the Supreme Court has given little guidance about when
to follow the permissive Saucier sequence and when it is appropriate for
a lower court to bypass the constitutional question and proceed directly
to the clearly established prong. Because the Kerns court did not declare
the officers' conduct a constitutional violation, or definitively not a con-
stitutional violation, the law is yet (or, still) not clearly established,
which means that that harm can continue repeating without a remedy.
And "what courts do, as opposed to what they say, is the effective
regulator for the scope of a given right." 25 8 A right is defined by its rem-
edy; or at least one can tell how important the court thinks a particular
right is by the remedy afforded when it has been violated. And "even if a
court says a lot about the value of a right, the manner in which it vindi-
cates that right is really what determines its value." 2 59 Put simply: with-
out a tangible remedy for its violation, no right can genuinely be said to
exist.260
The result in Kerns is especially troubling because it has ensured the
absence of a corresponding remedy for future plaintiffs. Furthermore, the
court even conceded that a right had been violated but found that the
right (or exigency, really) was not clearly established enough. 26 1 Alt-
hough, admittedly, the court did not make explicit the assertion that the
right had been violated, it appears clear that the court believed it had
256. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815; Garcia, 817 F.2d at 656-57 n.8.
257. And if the court, as it seems to do be doing here, requires such a high level of factual
specificity, the court should therefore be taking every opportunity to articulate the law under every
factual circumstance imaginable. This consistent articulation would balance the specificity require-
ment seemingly imposed in Kerns and help give the law definitive contours, while allowing police
and citizens to predict the law and conform their behavior accordingly.
258. See Owens, supra note 238, at 564.
259. Id. at 564-65.
260. See Levinson, supra note 171, at 894.
261. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[T]hat no constitutional
violation took place . .. isn't so clear in this case.").
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been violated. The Kerns court admitted it was not manifest that no con-
stitutional violation took place. It did not disturb or remand the lower
court's ruling on the constitutional prong; it only remanded on the clearly
established prong of the analysis.
Along with the decision in Martinez, it seems likely that the Kerns
court would agree that Kerns's right had been violated. Knowing it
would rely on the clearly established prong to remand the case, there are
several possible explanations for the court's failure to address the consti-
tutional issue. One possible explanation is the cognitive dissonance theo-
ry.262 "[J]udges are deeply uncomfortable with the notion of acknowledg-
ing a violation yet denying relief. Cognitive psychology research sup-
ports this notion: judges are reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional
violation where they subsequently intend to grant qualified immunity
because such a result induces a state of psychological discomfort known
as cognitive dissonance." 2 63 Perhaps the court simply did not feel com-
fortable explicitly declaring that a right had been violated and then re-
manding the case back to a lower court for the ultimate determination
because, as it knew, the law cannot be articulated at a level high enough
to become clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity.264
Similarly, not sequencing affects rights articulation as well. By de-
ciding first that a law is not clearly established, judges addressing the
constitutional question are less likely to find a violation of the right. 2 65
This reticence creates rights-constrictive law articulation because know-
ing that a plaintiff cannot recover for the harm makes it difficult for a
judge to say that a right has been violated in the first place. Therefore,
the articulation of the right at issue gets less protective based on the una-
vailability of the remedy.266 This illustrates how the articulation of im-
portant constitutional rights is shaped by the availability of the remedy,
or at least by the willingness of courts to grant that remedy. It also illus-
trates how sequencing-or not following the Saucier sequence-affects
the articulation of constitutional rights in general.
Whatever the reason for not addressing the underlying constitution-
al claim, the decision in Kerns amounts to an implicit acquiescence by
the court to affording no remedy for the right at issue. The Tenth Circuit
had to have been aware that Kerns's Fourth Amendment right would be
left unarticulated and without a remedy for its violation. By not discuss-
262. See Leong, supra note 61, at 670-71, 702-06, 708 (discussing the cognitive dissonance
theory as an explanation for judges articulating rights by way of remedies).
263. Id. at 670.
264. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15, 617-18 (1999); see also Cortez v. McCauley,
478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[For a right to be clearly established, 'there must be a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from
other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains."' (quoting Medina v. City of
Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992)).
265. See Owens, supra note 238, at 582.
266. See id.
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ing the right and not explicitly declaring that a violation occurred or did
not occur, the Kerns court left the right to be free from unreasonable
searches-of one's home no less-below the threshold for the clearly
established standard. The Kerns decision has arguably made the right
even less clearly established because the decision could be claimed at
this point to be in controversy with Martinez. At a minimum, the effect
of not sequencing in Kerns will result in the same remedy-less constitu-
tional violation in at least one more instance.
Although the concept of qualified immunity accepts this result once
in order to further articulation of the law, the idea is to make the law
more clear so that an unremedied constitutional violation does not hap-
pen repeatedly.267 The Kerns court is, in effect, kicking the can down the
road, waiting for the next Kerns case to make a decision about the right
at stake instead of taking the opportunity to articulate constitutional law
now. And, unfortunately, while that can is being kicked down the road,
those future plaintiffs suffering similar constitutional harms will be left
without any avenue for recovery.
That avoidance exemplifies a court willfully allowing for a violation
of the exact same constitutional right to go unremedied in the future. By
leaving the law unarticulated, the Kerns court has, with its eyes wide
open, guaranteed that, at the bare minimum, one more violation of the
exact same kind can occur and the plaintiff in that case too will be left
with no remedy, especially because the law will not be clearly estab-
lished for the purposes of qualified immunity even if the constitutional
issue is decided in Kerns's favor upon remand in the district court (ahem,
again). Leaving the law unarticulated means that another case with a
similar constitutional violation not only has to occur but also has to reach
the Tenth Circuit before the right can be articulated meaningfully. 268 And
in a repeat of Kerns's case that actually makes it up to the Tenth Circuit,
it would not yet have been decided by a court with sufficient authority.
So, the importance that the Kerns court places on this right is in question
and Fourth Amendment law articulation stalls, leaving unpredictable
protections. This prospect is especially disheartening because Kerns was
a prime opportunity for a federal court to articulate Fourth Amendment
law in the civil context, as opposed to the typical criminal context, and to
provide some balance to the articulation of Fourth Amendment law at
large.
Courts should not leave constitutional rights without a remedy for
violations thereof. Constitutional rights are arguably of greater im-
portance than rights deriving from other sources, as demonstrated by
their having been enshrined in the country's founding document as guar-
267. See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
268. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614-15, 617-18).
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antees.269 When a violation is identified, particularly by a federal court,
that court should be obligated to take it seriously and to take action to
ensure that the immediate case is the only time it is heard but not reme-
died. By addressing the qualified immunity analysis in an order opposite
the Saucier sequence, courts are able to recognize constitutional viola-
tions but decide the case on the clearly established prong without ad-
dressing the constitutional harm at all. This leaves the law unarticulated
and unclear for the purposes of qualified immunity moving forward.
Thus the right at issue does not become clearly established for subse-
quent cases and subsequent victims will similarly be left with no remedy
for the violations of their constitutional rights. This stalling in constitu-
tional rights articulation leaves individuals suffering constitutional harms
at the hands of government actors without a corresponding remedy. The
absence of remedy, in turn, defines the right, which means this cycle is
self-perpetuating and leads to less protections stemming from constitu-
tional rights.
IV. AND JUSTICE FOR ALL
When courts are faced with a "Kerns situation"-where a right ex-
ists and has been violated but it is clear that the harmed individual will be
left without a remedy or where the law could be blackened regarding that
right-there are several possible solutions. To make that determination,
in line with the underlying qualified immunity rationales, the question
courts should consider is the following: When the person in this case is
left with no remedy, is it possible that the next person could also be left
with no remedy?
To address this issue, I propose the admittedly novel Kerns solution.
In this solution, appellate courts would be required to decide the constitu-
tional issue. Consequently, the law would be articulated to ensure that
another similar harm does not take place without an available remedy for
the (subsequently) harmed individual. The Kerns solution is similar to
the mandated Saucier sequence, except that it would not be mandatory in
all cases, only in those cases in the Kerns situation. The Kerns solution
would be a balancing test outlined by factors to be weighed. One particu-
larly strong showing on a given factor could make up for a relatively
weak showing on another. The factors outlining the proposed Kerns solu-
tion and an obligatory decision on the constitutional question are as fol-
lows:
1. Will the immediate plaintiff be left without a remedy for a
constitutional harm? Under this factor, the rationales under-
lying qualified immunity would allow for the harm to take
place once without a remedy. But if the immediate plaintiff
269. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
686 [Vol. 90:3
THE A UDA CITY OF IGNORING HOPE
is left without a remedy, then it is likely that the next one
will draw the shortest straw as well.270
2. Is this a harm that has the potential to be repeated? Stated
another way: if the constitutional question is left un-
addressed here, would that potentially result in another in-
dividual being left with no remedy for a constitutional vio-
lation in the future? For example, if the issue were so factu-
ally anomalous that it is exceptionally unlikely the harm
could repeat, this factor would not be met. But, if in the eye
of the beholder there is seemingly any chance at all that the
harm could repeat, then the appellate courts should be re-
quired under this proposed Kerns solution test to address
the constitutional question for the purposes of clearly estab-
lishing the law.
3. Is this case sufficiently developed for this court to articulate
a meaningful legal principle? Put another way, would there
be a risk of making the law less clear, either as a result of
failing to address the constitutional issue, as in Kerns, or
because the factual record is insufficient to articulate a de-
cent legal principle? This factor is designed to ensure that
the facts surrounding the constitutional merits are reasona-
bly developed so that the law that does get articulated is
useful and consequential. In those cases where there is need
for additional factual development, the "procedural trigger"
solution, described below, should be incorporated into this
step.
Another possible solution, either as a stand-alone solution or in
combination with the third factor of the Kerns solution, is the procedural
trigger solution. Under this solution, if a case needed to be remanded
(a) for development of the factual record in order to articulate the legal
principle correctly or (b) as in Kerns, on the qualified immunity prong
and was ultimately decided in a lower court on the constitutional merits
where the level of authority would not sufficiently establish constitution-
al law, it would automatically trigger a demarcated procedural kick,
sending the case back up to a circuit court to affirm the ruling at the level
sufficient to clearly establish the law for future cases. This solution will
ensure a well-developed factual record on the constitutional issue be-
cause the case would necessarily have gone through the trial phase on
that issue and the parties would be aware of the need to brief it. It would
270. Note that the law could be articulated here in either direction. The test would be truncated
at this point if it were determined that the immediate plaintiff suffered no constitutionally cognizable
harm. At least then, however, if the law were articulated such that a constitutional violation were not
recognized, there would be no underlying constitutional harm in the next case, and the Kerns solu-
tion would have served its purpose of articulating the law.
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also allow a federal court-one arguably more experienced in constitu-
tional issues-to oversee the issue and the ensuing articulation of rights.
This solution would also ensure that in all cases where a constitutional
right was at issue-whether a right was found to exist or not-that right
would thereafter be clearly established for the purposes of a remedy be-
ing available in the future.
In the interest of articulating useful constitutional principles, and for
cases in which the record is truly insufficient to do so, the procedural
trigger solution should be embraced within the third step of the Kerns
solution for more in-depth factual development at the trial level. In the
procedural trigger solution, those cases bearing on important constitu-
tional issues but not developed enough to make good law would be re-
manded for rehearing on the constitutional merits. Such cases then would
automatically be kicked back up to the circuit level for a recognition of
the right, thereby establishing the law clearly at the necessary circuit
level.
One anticipated counterargument to the Kerns solution is that the
record on appeal may not be factually developed enough. In those cases,
the concern is that courts would be prone to getting the constitutional
question wrong, articulating bad law. But this factual development con-
cern is already extant to a lesser degree in all appellate cases. If the solu-
tion proposed here were to be adopted, the procedural trigger solution
accounts for it, necessitates rehearing at trial, and accounts for clearly
establishing rights at the circuit level. Diluting constitutional rights and
their corresponding remedies for the sake of not re-briefing issues or
remanding as part of this solution seems like a precarious ransom when
constitutional rights are at stake.
Another possible solution is reinstating the mandatory Saucier se-
quencing, but making one of two narrow exceptions to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The first possibility is to allow for an immediate ap-
peal (before addressing the clearly established prong) on the constitu-
tional issue for those parties who lose on that prong. This exception
would allow for the non-prevailing party to appeal the constitutional is-
sue while maintaining the incentive for parties to litigate it before even
reaching the clearly established prong.27 1 Conversely, an exception could
be made to allow for an interlocutory appeal after both prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis have been decided for those parties who
prevail only on the qualified immunity question.
Finally, another solution that has been previously suggested is to
"provid[e] more specific guidance to lower courts regarding when se-
271. Thanks to Nick Poppe for suggesting this variation during one of many excellent discus-
sions.
[Vol. 90:3688
THE A UDA CITY OF IGNORING HOPE
quencing is and is not appropriate."272 The Kerns solution provides just
that guidance and ensures that plaintiffs suffering constitutional harms
are not left without a remedy.
CONCLUSION
"Absence of a remedy is absence of a right." 273 Maintaining the in-
tegrity of constitutional rights relies on the real world vindication of
those rights when a violation has occurred. When constitutional rights
are at stake, courts should be careful to ensure that those rights are
strengthened instead of diluted. Rights are strengthened when remedies
are afforded that provide a tangible, corresponding resolution for their
violation.
When courts are given ineffectual guidelines about what it means
for a right to be clearly established, or about when to decide the constitu-
tional issues in a qualified immunity case, the integrity of our constitu-
tional rights is put in jeopardy because the result is the opportunity for
unremedied, albeit recognized, violations. By ignoring the lesson from
Hope that general statements of law are not inherently incapable of es-
tablishing a law, it gets more difficult to articulate constitutional rights
because those available remedies begin to dissolve in the absence of
rights articulation, specifically in the context of qualified immunity, and
often therefore under the Fourth Amendment at large. The result of leav-
ing rights unarticulated is a diminished availability of remedies for the
violations of those rights. Fewer and increasingly unreachable remedies
result in incomplete and increasingly unarticulated rights. And so the
cycle goes. Kerns is an example of this difficulty of rights articulation
and the disappointing effect on the underlying right.
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